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   1.  Introduction 
 
In 2008, food prices soared to a boiling point, triggering of riots from Haiti to Bangladesh 
to Egypt over the soaring cost of basic foods and causing mass social tensions even in 
high-growth countries like China and India and in wealthy nations like the USA and 
Italy. More recently, in 2011, several North African countries fell prey to riots and mass 
demonstrations, and again these protests occurred in a climate of rising food prices. Apart 
from these recent events, several historic events testify of the role of food prices in 
explaining social unrest, among many others the 1684 Moscow Salt Riot, the 1713 
Boston bread riot, the 1837 New York City Flour Riot, and the 1918 Rice Riots in Japan.  
Hence, both recent and historic events point to a close link between riots and food 
prices. But, what remains of this association if we subject it to a rigorous empirical test, 
controlling for unobservable cross-country heterogeneity? And, how exactly do price-
induced grievances experienced by individuals sum up to mass demonstrations? 
Answering these questions should lead to better insight in the impact of food 
prices on social unrest. Such insight is valuable, not only because it helps to understand 
real world events, but also because it allows policymakers to assess the real cost of rising 
food prices. When social unrest takes the form of peaceful demonstrations, it can be 
argued that it is a social good rather than a bad, since the public may receive utility from 
expressing their concerns and the demonstrations may lead to government actions that 
respond to the public’s preferences
1
Sidestepping this issue for the moment, this article aims at providing a credible 
estimate on the impact of food prices on social unrest manifested in the form of 
demonstrations or, when turning violent, riots. The empirical analysis consists of two 
main parts. In the first part, we analyze monthly data on riots and international food 
prices for the period 1990-2010. The event data are taken from the PRIO Social 
Disturbance dataset, while food prices are captured by an international food price index 
that is calculated as an export share weighted average of international prices for five 
commodity group indices - cereals, meat, dairy products, sugar and oil &fat.  
. This is in line with the argument of Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001) that transitory economic shocks can give rise to a democratic window of 
opportunity. On the other hand, social unrest can take the form of riots, which can turn 
violent, leading to casualties, destroying private and public property, and opening a 
window of opportunity for criminals to loot. When riots persist, they may divert both 
domestic and foreign investment increasing economic hardship, and when riots occur in 
important food or oil producing countries, they may in turn lead to increases in 
commodity prices. This being said, there has been no empirical assessment so far of the 
cost and benefits of demonstrations and riots.  
In the second part, we compare results for the period 1990-2010 with results for a longer 
time period, 1960-1910. Due to data limitations, this analysis uses US wheat prices 
instead of the more general and appropriate international food price index. The findings 
of the post-1990 analysis indicate that a one percent increase in the deviation of prices 
from the long-run trend increases the relative probability (odds) of occurrence of a 
disturbance manifold, ranging from twice to 12 times depending on the specification. 
                                                 
1 Note that countries seeking to reduce the political cost from rising food prices by altering trade 
restrictions at their national border (e.g. the imposition of export restrictions) may initially succeed in 
dampening increases in domestic food prices, but the more countries revert to such actions, the more these 
actions become collectively self-defeating, reducing the role that global trade can play in dampening 
fluctuations in international prices (Anderson and Nelgen, 2010). Comparing the results across 1960-2010 and the sub period 1990-2010, we find that the 
association between food prices and social unrest became stronger over time, in particular  
for the reaction of consumers upon price increases, whereas the reaction of producers to 
price decreases remained largely unchanged). 
This paper’s focus on monthly time series of the past two decades makes it 
distinct from two recent working papers, Hendrix et al. (2009) and Arzeki and Brückner 
(2011), that study the impact of food prices on social unrest analyzing annual data from 
respectively the periods 1961-2006 and 1970-2007. Hendrix et al. (2009) find that 
producers react more easily with riots upon a price decrease than consumers react upon a 
price increase. Arzeki and Brückner (2011) report that a one standard deviation increase 
in the food price index increases the number of anti-government demonstrations and riots 
by about 0.01 standard deviations. 
 The use of monthly rather than annual time series is expected to add to the 
accuracy of the estimated coefficient of interest. First, monthly data has the advantage of 
capturing within-year fluctuations in prices, which, due to the impact of weather and pest 
related shocks may be high, even after taking into account the usual seasonal fluctuations 
(Petersen and Tomek, 2005). Second, when looking at the sequence of real world events, 
we note that the relationship between food price shocks and social unrest is rather 
instantaneous instead of characterized by important lags, justifying the use a high 
frequency time series. Thirdly, the use of monthly data multiplies the number of data 
points, allowing a sub period analysis for the past 20 years. In its turn, the focus on post-
1990 data in the main analysis is useful for a number of reasons. First, a major difference 
between the historic riots in the 17
th-19
th century and the present-day riots is the global 
character of the latter. Rather than being triggered of by local harvest failures or local 
government decisions (e.g. tax increases), the causes of the fluctuations in food prices in 
modern times were global (e.g. increased global demand for raw materials). Moreover, 
globalization has continued to evolve in the past twenty years and hence has continued to 
shape the factors that influence the level and volatility of international food prices. 
Second, in the time span of the past two decades, a number of countries have transformed 
themselves from food exporting to food importing countries, and vice versa (Ng and 
Aksoy, 2008). Third, we will also argue that the internet revolution, which is by now a 
fact in many parts of the developing world, has altered the dynamics of protest 
movements, first by making them more contagious through the rapid spread of news 
events, and second, by providing activists with a powerful device, i.e. online social 
networking, to coordinate actions and overcome the collective action problem that often 
constraints demonstrations and protest movements. In sum, when aiming at quantifying 
the impact of food prices on protests in a globalized and connected world, the events in 
the ‘60s, ‘70s and ‘80s should arguably receive less weight than those in the past two 
decades. 
The remainder of the paper starts with a discussion of the determinants of food prices 
and protests. Section 3 sets out the empirical framework. In section 4, we provide an 
overview of the data sources used. Section 5 discusses the statistical results. Section 6 
concludes. 




2.1. Food price spikes: a review of causes and consequences 
For the second time in a relatively short period, food prices have reached a historic high. 
The recent two spikes (May 2008 and January 2011) are only matched by the dramatic 
rise of commodity prices in the mid 1970s and early 1980s. Whichever combination of 
the alleged causal factors will win the bid – financial speculation, growing demand from 
booming economies, climate change, exchange rate fluctuations, or the demand for 
alternative energy sources – the fact remains that many of these factors have gained in 
importance over the past two decades and will persist for a number of years and even 
decades to come. As a consequence, the recent food price surges may be a prelude to 
further price spikes, rendering a study of the possible consequences for social unrest 
particularly relevant. Since macro- as well as micro- conditions determine the extent to 
which countries and households are affected by food price changes, we should take up 
the challenge to control for a number of factors when determining the impact of 
international food prices on domestic social unrest. The choice to use international prices 
(instead of domestic prices) is taken despite this challenge, mainly because of their 
exogenous character and data availability. To account for country characteristics, we 
revert to country fixed effects. We will elaborate further on this in sections 3 and 4. 
 
2.2. Protests: how small (price) shocks can put in motion a revolutionary bandwagon 
How and under which circumstances do price-induced grievances translate into protests? 
It is well documented that economic theory, assuming self-interested rational individuals, 
predicts an undersupply of collective action (Olson, 1965). At the same time, the frequent 
occurrence of mass demonstrations and protests contradicts this basic economic insight. 
This has led to two strands of literature that try to reconcile this apparent contradiction. A 
first strand argues that mass political movements cannot be explained by models based on 
rational preferences and, instead, puts forward expressive theories of participation 
whereby a person places value on the act of political expression itself (e.g. Opp, 1988; 
Klosko et al., 1987; Muller and Opp, 1986; Verba et al., 2000). Kuran (1989)’s model 
provides us with a useful framework to think about the way price shocks can lead to mass 
protests. The factors that matter are threefold: (1) the size of the shock; (2) the initial 
distribution of discontent in society; and (3) the impact of the shock on this distribution. 
The latter depends on the nature of the shock, with shocks such as price changes being 
more powerful because they do not only affect discontent of extremists but also of 
moderates.  
 
2.3. Protests: the collective action problem and the Facebook generation 
The dynamic informational cascade theory of Lohmann (1993, 1994, 2000) belongs to a 
second strand of literature that has developed several theories on how collective action 
can emerge from rational behaviour at the level of the individual. It is particularly 
relevant in our case, since it highlights the role of information streams and signalling, 
allowing us to formulate hypotheses on the role of online communication in present-day 
mass mobilization. The most important distinctive feature of Lohmann’s theory is that an 
individual’s action not only contributes to overturning the status quo in a given period 
                                                 
2 Note that this section is reduced from an initial 7 pages to merely 2 pages for the sake of reducing the 
length of the paper to the required 12 pages. The full discussion can be obtained on request from the 
authors. (because, as in Kuran’s model, it makes the number of people taking costly action 
exceeding a critical threshold), but it also signals the actor’s information about the status 
quo (the quality of a policy, regime, etc) and influences other people’s decisions to act or 
abstain. This signalling function of an action makes an individual action non-negligible in 
overturning the status quo, which explains why rational individuals that care about 
overturning the status quo engage in costly collective action. An important note to make 
is that the strength of the signal, i.e. the value attached to the information, depends on the 
type of the sender. For example, moderates will attach less importance to signals send by 
extremists than to signals send by other moderates because moderates know that the 
preferences of extremists may not be in line with their own preferences. In the words of 
Lohmann (2000) “The participation of moderates (actors who generate reliable 
informational cues) is crucial for the success of a social movement, but the 
(uninformative) turnout of ‘extremists’ is discounted.” Because of this feature, the impact 
of group heterogeneity is not monotonous. In fact: “Overall, the maximum degree of 
information revelation is associated with the degree of group heterogeneity that 
maximizes the number of activist moderates.” 
The role accorded to signalling has important implications for the possible impact 
of mass media and online (political) communities. Firstly, both mass media and online 
communities allow the public to take notice of the signals sent, whereas otherwise many 
signals may be blocked by those that benefit from a status quo. Second, both may be 
instrumental in coordinating action in the sense that the former reduces information 
asymmetries and the latter is a tool in enhancing the simultaneity of turnout, e.g. by 
agreeing on the timing and location of turnout. Such coordination is important because a 
mass demonstration does not necessarily take place when sufficient people lower their 
thresholds, but only when they do so simultaneously. Thirdly, online communities play 
an additional role by allowing individuals to signal their perception of the status quo at a 
very low cost. This new form of signalling is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it 
lowers the value of the signal because receivers know that the risks of signalling are 
much lower. On the other hand, it increases the number of senders, and importantly, 
especially among the moderates, who otherwise might have found the cost of signalling 
too high. 
 In sum, this discussion highlights the role of online networking as a tool that can 
significantly contribute to the power of informational cascades. Let us conclude with 
anecdotal evidence from the Egypt revolution to stress this point further
3. As a reaction to 
social unrest in Egypt in January 2011, the Egyptian Government instructed providers to 
shutdown services in parts of the country
4. In addition, all mobile operators in Egypt 
were instructed to suspend services supporting cell phone text messages in selected 
areas
5
                                                 
3 Sources: BGPmon, a monitoring site that checks connectivity of countries. Internet intelligence authority 
Renesys: http://www.renesys.com/blog/2011/01/egypt-leaves-the-internet.shtml. BBC news: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12306041. Huffington post: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/03/vodafone-egypt-text-messages_n_817952.html 
. These actions on the part of the Egyptian government were clearly motivated by 
the aim to prevent activists from communicating to agree on timing and locations of their 
actions and to post pictures, tweets and videos live from the action. There is ample 
evidence that, apart from helping protesters to coordinate actions and send out signals 
4 Between January, 27 and January, 31, the number of reachable Egyptian networks decreased from 2903 to 
134, a decrease of more than 95% .  
5 Moreover, the Egyptian government required Vodafone Egypt to send pro-government advertisement as 
text messages. once the protest bandwagon was rolling, online communication was used to set the 
bandwagon in motion. Right after a businessman, Khaled Said, died in police custody in 
Alexandria in June 2010, Wael Ghonim, the Egyptian-born Google marketing executive, 
started the Facebook page 'We are all Khaled Said'. The page  became a rallying point for 
a campaign against police brutality. For many Egyptians, it revealed details of the extent 
of torture in their country (resulting in updates of x
i), and the page increased its numbers 
of followers (S). However, until January 2011, most of the followers were youngsters 
who chose to hide their identity for fear of persecution. As argued above, it is no 
coincidence that at a time of food price increases the protest gained in momentum and 
started to appeal to “moderates”. In the words of Wael Ghonim: "This is the revolution of 
the youth of the internet, which became the revolution of the youth of Egypt, then the 
revolution of Egypt itself". Clearly, without the new media a rather ordinary (read 
credible) person like Wael would not have been able to send signals to so many people. 
 
2.4. Related studies  
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two empirical studies on the 
relationship between international food prices and social unrest. First, a working paper by 
Hendrix et al. (2009) studies the link between food prices and social unrest for the period 
1961-2006. Second, another working paper, Arzeki and Brückner (2011) examines the 
effects that variations in the international food prices have on democracy and intra-state 
conflict using panel data for over 120 countries during the period 1970-2007. The current 
article differs from these previous studies in four main ways, by (1) using the most recent 
data up to 2010, (2) analysing monthly rather than annual time series, (3) performing a 
sub period analysis for 1990-2010, and by (4) determine the price shocks with Hodrick-




. The next section elaborates on our empirical approach. 
3.  Empirical framework 
 
The general empirical specification can be written as follows:  
01 [Pr( 1)] . _ im i im im g unrest price fluctuation αα ε ==++                                                  (I) 
where g(p)=log[p/(1-p)] is the logit link function that maps the linear index with the 
response probability of an event taking place in a country i in a given month m;   0i α  
indicates the country-specific fixed effects; and _ im price fluctuation is the fluctuation in 
real (logged) food prices with respect to the long-run trend. The price fluctuation is 
obtained by first de-seasoning the logged real price series using Holt-Winters seasonal 
smoothing (Holt, 1957: Winters, 1960) and then decomposing the resulting series by 
Hodrick-Prescott filtering to identify a long-term trend and the shocks to the trend
7
                                                 
6 We owe thanks to Romain Houssa for suggesting the HP approach. 
. The 
latter correspond to the fluctuations in the real food price.  
7 We make use of the Hodrick-Prescott (1981,1997), or HP-filter, generally used in the macroeconomic 
literature to extract business cycles from long-run trend of economic activity. The basic underlying concept 
remaining the same, HP-filtering of (logged and de-seasoned) international food price series leads to one 
series reflecting the general trend in food prices and another revealing the shocks or fluctuations in price 
index around that trend. The logged food price index series is deseasoned using the Holt- Winters 
smoothing.  
 In order to distinguish between the incentives to protest for producers and 
consumers, we run a second empirical specification: 





_ im price fluctuation
+
   ( _ im price fluctuation
− ) takes the value zero for negative 
(positive) fluctuations from the trend. 
  Both equations I and II are estimated using monthly time series data. As argued in 
the introduction, this is likely to be appropriate because of (1) important within-year 
fluctuations in prices, (2) the instantaneous nature of the relationship between food prices 
and demonstrations, (3) the multiplication of data points which allows a sub period 
analysis for the two most recent decades. In addition, it can be argued that many forms of 
protests are short-lived. For example, the recent toppling of Tunisian and Egyptian 
governments last month took respectively 28 and 18 days from the first incident until the 
toppling of the government. Furthermore, from the FAO webpage on government 
responses to the 2008 food price spike, we observe that such responses take around four 
weeks on average to implement measures intended to appease the protesting populace.
8
 Finally, whereas the use of country-fixed effects allows us to control for country-
characteristics that remain fixed over time, the use of monthly data effectively rules out 
bias from variables that only change slowly over time. Therefore, in the main 
specification we do not control for country characteristics that vary over time, both 
because few accurate monthly level data exists on such characteristics and because it 
seems reasonable to assume that the most relevant characteristics – e.g. GDP/capita, 
unemployment level and urbanization level – do not exhibit much variation across the 
different months. Moreover, several of these characteristics may be thought as 
endogenous, and hence, whereas including them may reduce omitted variable bias (to the 
extent that their short term variation immediately instigates protests), it may lead to other 
forms of endogeneity bias. In a future version of this paper, we will add robustness 
checks that control for a number of relevant time-varying country characteristics. 
 
Thus, a year seems to be too long a period to see the effect of something that changes too 
often on something that is spontaneous and quick-lasting.  
Not only does it lesson the problem of reverse causality, as governments do take 
action in view of protests to mediate and affect the prices, but also record of incidence of 
onset as a binary variable seems to be less prone to misunderstanding related events of 
the same movement as distinct thereby introducing error in the count and lending itself 
even more to sample selection bias (selection of news reports from places already under 
spotlight or public attention) attributable to the news agency (Keesing’s in our case). 
In our main specification the dependent variable is the occurrence of an event 
characterized by any kind of social disturbance during the period 1990-2010.  As a first 
robustness check, we restrict our sample to incidents of unrest marked by the 
participation of the general public as one of the actors involved (events coded as riots, 
demonstrations, pro- or anti- government terrorism). In addition, in order to check 
whether the events in 2008 and 2010 – by some tagged as exceptional - are driving our 
results we remove those two years from the sample.  
                                                 
8 See http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ai470e/ai470e05.htm for policy response, and (Schneider (2008) for a 
comprehensive account of events in 2008. In the main specification for the sub period analysis (1990-2010), we use the FAO 
(international) monthly food price index. In a robustness check, we use the more 
restricted price series of cereals as well as the US all-wheat cash price (deflated using US 
CPI). For the data analysis using time series since 1960, we rely only on the US all-wheat 
cash price, since it is the only one available for that time period. 
 
4.  Data  
We make use of the updated Urban Social Disturbances in Asia and Africa (USDAA) 
dataset compiled by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, that tabulates  
event-related news reports sourced from Keesing’s world news archive in 55 cities in 49 
countries in Asia and Africa, from 1960 onwards through 2010  (Urdal, 2008). The 
events are classified and accordingly coded ranging from those related to civil war, 
armed/terrorist attacks to those involving government repression, riots and 
demonstrations. We aggregated the original city-level data at country level. So if any one 
city of a multiple-city country in the dataset experiences an event, the dependent variable 
assumes the value of one. Figure 1 tracks their evolution over time, with a distinction 
made between the occurrence of all events and those associated with riots and 
demonstrations. 
The data on international food prices is obtained from the FAO Food Price Index 
database (Figure 2). In calculating the index, the FAO classifies 55 commodity quotations 
into 5 groups-meat, dairy, cereals, oil & fat and sugar and takes the average of these 
indices, weighting them by their average export shares over 2002-2004. These indices 
themselves are constructed by export-weighted average of the respective combination of 
commodity quotation  included therein. One of these indices, the cereal price index, is 
used as a robustness check. Monthly series are available starting from January 1990. As a 
robustness check and for the analysis prior to 1990, we use monthly data from the United 
States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Unit for cash prices of different 
varieties of wheat (Figure 3) to be deflated using the CPI data from World Development 
Indicators (the latter is available only till 2008). 
 
5.  Empirical findings 
  
The estimation of equation I indicates a strong association between price shocks and the 
onset of social disturbance. More specifically, the coefficient  1 α associated with the first 
specification turns out to be significant at a 1% level and corresponds to a value of 12.32, 
which should be read as  the change in the odds ratio of an event taking place in response 
to a 1% (absolute) change in deviation from the long-run price trend (or put simply, 
shock)
9
  When distinguishing between consumer and producer effects, we find coefficients 
of similar magnitudes for respectively the positive and negative price shocks (Table 1 
column 2). This stands in contrast with Hendrix et al., who find larger responses among 
producers than consumers in their analysis of annual time series for 1960-2006. Below 
we demonstrate that this difference can be attributed to the shift in the period of focus.  
.  
The findings remain qualitatively the same when using the cereal price index or 
excluding the peak spike years, 2008 and 2010. However, in both of these robustness 
                                                 
9 The associated marginal effect is about .10 (evaluated at the mean change), or in other words there is a 
probability of 10% associated with occurrence of an event. checks, the quantitative impact is less pronounced, with an 80% decrease in the former 
case and a 40% decrease in the odds ratio in the latter (Table 1 columns 3, 4 and 5). The 
findings also remain similar when including only ‘mass’ events (Table 2).  
For the years prior to 1990, the detailed FAO price indices are not available. 
Hence, to compare results between 1960-2010 and the post-1990 sub-period, we rely on a 
different monthly time series data, i.e. the US all-wheat data, which was also used in the 
analysis of Hendrix et al. (2009). The results are reported in Table 3. Whereas the 
estimated coefficient of the wheat price shock is insignificant for the period 1960-2008, it 
turns significant for the sub period 1990-2008. Moreover, distinguishing between price 
shocks that negatively affect consumers and producers, we find that this cross-period 
difference is entirely driven by a stronger reaction of consumer upon food price increases. 
This may be driven by the fact that the past two decades were characterized by dramatic 
price increases rather than decreases. On the other hand, this finding is also in line with 
our hypothesis on the role of improved communication in the ‘new era’, which may 
especially be helpful to overcome coordination problems for consumers, not only due to 
greater heterogeneity compared to producers, but also due to lack of alternative forms of 
organizing like the producer lobbies.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Recent events have led governments and international organisations to excogitate the 
implications of changing, in particular, increasing food prices. One of the plausible 
impacts, not least surmised from media ballyhoo, is to fan grievances and provide 
incentives to engage in collective action that challenges the status quo. This study 
attempts to understand the actualities of such a relationship at an international level, for 
major cities in Asia and Africa. 
In a conceptual framework that builds on models of political mobilization, it is 
shown that food price increases can act as a coordination device and trigger of a powerful 
cascade in collective action precisely because food is such a basic necessity that it can 
mobilize ‘the moderates’ which otherwise would not engage in costly collective actions. 
We also discussed how mass media and online communities add to the power of this 
informational cascade and  may have strengthened the relationship between food prices 
and protests over time.  
In the empirical part, we subject the relationship between food price changes and 
protests to a rigorous test, controlling for country fixed effects. In contrast to previous 
studies, we do so using monthly data  and including the most recent data available. It is 
argued that the use of monthly data is appropriate because of the occurrence of important 
within-year fluctuations in food prices, the short-lived character of many forms of 
protests, the instantaneous character of the relationship between price changes and 
protests, and the reduction of possible omitted variable bias stemming from time varying 
country characteristics.  
Moreover, the use of monthly data allows us to work with a relatively long time 
series for the two most recent decades, which in its turn allows a detailed post-1990 
analysis. The sub period analysis for 1990-2010 is useful, not only because better data is 
available for the post-1990 period, but also because, as argued in the conceptual 
framework, both the evolution in the global food system and in communication 
technology may have profoundly affected the impact of food price changes on social 
unrest. Our sub period analysis indicates that a one percent increase in the deviation from 
the trend in food prices, significantly increases the odds ratio of an urban disturbance 
event. This is true both for a positive and a negative deviation from the trend, indicating 
that net-consumers of food as well as net-producers engage in collective action upon 
price changes. When comparing results across the entire time series (1960-2008) and the 
sub period (1990-2008), we find that the relationship between food price increase and 
social unrest has become stronger over time. No such change can be found for the 
relationship between food price decreases and social unrest. These results are robust to 
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Table 1. Impact of food price changes on the incidence of social unrest, all events 
 
 
Table 2. Impact of food price changes on the incidence of social unrest, riots and demonstrations 
 
Table 3. Impact of food price increases on social unrest, all events: 1960-2008 and 1990-2008 
   
Dep var, protest=yes/no
Monthly series
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1990-2010 All events All events All events All events All events(w/o '08,'10)
VARIABLES Food price index Food price index Cereal price index Cereal price index Food price index
Absolute positive price shock 13.21*** 2.100*
(Zero for negative fluctuations) (8.816) (0.808)
Absolute negative shock only 10.44*** 1.230
(Zero for positive fluctuations) (9.311) (0.783)
Absolute price shock 12.32*** 1.955* 7.514**
(7.502) (0.742) (6.884)
Country fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 12,348 12,348 12,348 12,348 11,172
Number of country_id 49 49 49 49 49
Odds ratio (se in parentheses)




1990-2010 Riots and demonstrations Riots and demonstrations
VARIABLES Food price index Food price index
Absolute positive price shock 12.42***
(Zero for negative fluctuations) (9.344)
Absolute negative shock only 8.877**
(Zero for positive fluctuations) (9.028)
Absolute price shock 11.26***
(7.766)
Country fixed-effects yes yes
Observations 12,096 12,096
Number of country_id 48 48
Odds ratio (se in parentheses)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dep var, protest=yes/no
Monthly series
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All events 1960-2008 All events 1960-2008 All events 1990-2008 All events 1990-2008
VARIABLES US All Wheat US All Wheat US All Wheat  US All Wheat 
Absolute positive price shock 1.002 2.738**
(Zero for negative fluctuations) (0.288) (1.190)
Absolute negative shock only 1.414 1.165
(Zero for positive fluctuations) (0.481) (0.621)
Absolute price shock 1.134 2.038*
(0.291) (0.816)
Country fixed-effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 28,812 28,812 11,172 11,172
Number of country_id 49 49 49 49
Odds ratio (se in parentheses)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1